Responsibility, applied ethics, and complex autonomy theories

In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 162-180 (2005)
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Abstract

I argue that despite it being said often that the concept of personal autonomy is important for grounding moral responsibility and in applied ethics, a certain type of theories of autonomy and identification, descended from the work of Harry Frankfurt starting 1971, are not relevant in an obvious way to either moral responsibility or applied ethics.

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Nomy Arpaly
Brown University

Citations of this work

Autonomy and false beliefs.Suzy Killmister - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):513-531.
The Trouble with Formal Views of Autonomy.Jonathan Knutzen - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (2).

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