Nudge and Shove

Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):668-691 (2015)
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Abstract

This essay reexamines the idea of paternalism and the basis for finding it objectionable in light of recent writings on “libertarian paternalism.” Suggestion: to qualify as paternalistic, an interference that restricts someone’s liberty or interferes with her choice-making with the aim of helping the individual must be contrary to that very individual’s will. A framework for determining the justifiability of paternalistic action is proposed, under the assumption that the individual has a personal prerogative, up to a point, to engage in less than maximally beneficial action. Beyond that point, the content of the will of the individual disposed against interference can extinguish the presumptive wrongness of paternalism.

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Richard J. Arneson
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Paternalism towards children.Kalle Grill - 2018 - In Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder & Jurgen de Wispelaere, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children. New York: Routledge. pp. 123-133.
The Choice Architect’s Trilemma.Chris Mills - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (3):395-414.
Liberalism, Paternalism, and Autonomy.Konstantin Morozov - 2023 - Discourses of Ethics 3 (19):31-52.

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