Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility

Analysis 70 (1):11-23 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In a series of articles, Dan Lopez De Sa and Elia Zardini argue that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, Lopez De Sa and Zardini claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. It is our contention that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, their arguments fail to undermine the instances of reasoning they attack, either because they fail to see everything that is at work in that reasoning, or because they misunderstand what it is that the reasoning aims to show.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Further Reflections on Sentences Saying of Themselves Strange Things.Elia Zardini - 2017 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4):563-581.
Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
Contraction, Infinitary Quantifiers, and Omega Paradoxes.Lucas Rosenblatt & Bruno Ré - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):611-629.
Horwich and Semantic Epistemicism.Sergi Oms - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 53:99-103.
Contraction, Infinitary Quantifiers, and Omega Paradoxes.Bruno Da Ré & Lucas Rosenblatt - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):611-629.
In defence of an argument against truthmaker maximalism.Jerzy Gołosz - 2014 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 24 (1):105-109.
On Using Inconsistent Expressions.Arvid Båve - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):133-148.
Inconsistency and replacement.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):387-402.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-12-26

Downloads
838 (#28,356)

6 months
164 (#23,923)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Bradley Armour-Garb
State University of New York, Albany
James Woodbridge
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

References found in this work

Vagueness and contradiction.Roy A. Sorensen - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.
Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy Sorensen - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):695-703.
Blindspots.Michael Levin - 1991 - Noûs 25 (3):389-392.

View all 20 references / Add more references