Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of mind

Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93 (1973)
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Abstract

A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind

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10.1086/288514

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Citations of this work

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References found in this work

An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.
Minds, Machines and Gödel.John R. Lucas - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):112-127.
Philosophy and Scientific Realism.J. J. C. Smart - 1965\ - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15 (60):358-360.
Minds, Machines and Gödel.J. R. Lucas - 1961 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.

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