Toward an ontological interpretation of Dennett's theory

Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-369 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

While "Consciousness Explained" has received an enormous amount of attention since its publication, there is still little agreement on what Dennett’s account of consciousness is. Most interpreters treat his view as an instance of one or another of the standard ontological positions (functionalism, behaviorism, eliminativism, instrumentalism). I believe a different metaphysical account underlies Dennett’s view, one that is important though ill-understood. In the paper I attempt to point in the direction of a proper characterization of that account through the use of two illustrative examples. A ten-point story that applies to the examples is developed, and it is suggested that the story applies equally well to Dennett’s view of consciousness.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,873

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Consciousness Explained: Ignoring Ryle. and Co.Sonia Sedivy - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):455-483.
Eliminativism and indeterminate consciousness.Glenn Braddock - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.
Dennett’s Account of Mind versus Kim’s Supervenience Argument.Zbigniew Marczuk - 2011 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 16 (2):1-15.
Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in Consciousness Explained.Anthony A. Derksen - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):29-48.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
214 (#121,391)

6 months
9 (#411,419)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Antony
University of Haifa

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations