Ape Autonomy? Social norms and moral agency in other species

In Petrus Klaus & Wild Markus (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Animals: Mind, Ethics, Morals. Transcript. pp. 173-196 (2013)
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Abstract

Once upon a time, not too long ago, the question about apes and ethics had to do with moral standing—do apes have interests or rights that humans ought to respect? Given the fifty years of research on great ape cognition, life history, social organization, and behavior, the answer to that question seems obvious. Apes have emotions and projects, they can be harmed, and they have important social relationships

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Kristin Andrews
York University