Abstract

Why is healthcare ‘special’ to the extent that it should be distributed more equally than other social goods, as a matter of justice? Norman Daniels claims that healthcare is special because it protects the normal range of opportunities available to us, and therefore can be subsumed under a principle of justice which establishes that opportunity ought to be equally distributed. I argue that subsuming healthcare under such a principle leads to de facto discrimination against certain people in virtue of their healthcare needs. This is because—as a critical discussion of health and healthcare needs importantly illustrates—much of the healthcare that people need simply cannot or does not protect normal species function, and therefore does not protect opportunity. And so, such healthcare needs go unfairly unmet on Daniels’ view. Instead, I suggest that we ought to subsume healthcare under a principle of equally distributing the social bases of self-respect. Though the healthcare that many of us need cannot protect opportunity, it can still protect our sense of self-respect; as such, those who need such care are entitled to it as a matter of justice on the self-respect view. The self-respect view thus avoids de facto discrimination and ultimately meets healthcare needs more fairly. And because it does so by eschewing a controversial conception of health and healthcare, instead appealing to a conception that appears freestanding with respect to the doctrines that citizens might reasonably disagree about, it better satisfies the requirements of public justification.