Carnap and Wittgenstein on Psychological Sentences: 1928–1932. Some Further Aspects of the Priority-Dispute Over Physicalism

In Denis Fisette, Guillaume Fréchette & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy. New York: Springer. pp. 353-386 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The question of how physicalism originated is a complex one, to which we cannot expect an unambiguous answer. The major reason for this is that there were different formulations of the doctrine, which makes it near impossible to identify the inventor of physicalism. Nonetheless, the received view is that the main actors were Neurath and Carnap: Neurath proposed his versions of physicalism earlier, but it was Carnap who first published an elaborated formulation of the metalinguistic doctrine according to which the universal language of science ought to be physical language. However, in 1932 Wittgenstein accused Carnap of plagiarism concerning physicalism (ignoring Neurath's contributions completely). There is considerable literature on the origins of physicalism as well as on the priority-dispute between Wittgenstein and Carnap. The aim of my paper is to contribute to these investigations. However, I look at the topic from a somewhat different angle, in the following regard. Examinations of the diverse early physicalist doctrines as well as of the priority claims concerning physicalism tended to focus on the accounts of “primary language” or “protocol language”; on whether observation sentences ought to be formulated in phenomenalistic or physicalistic language, referring to experiences or to physical objects and their properties. In contrast, I concentrate on Carnap's and Wittgenstein's views on the content of psychological sentences, in particular heteropsychological sentences, which report the psychological states of other persons. Carnap and Wittgenstein both proposed physicalistic-behaviouristic accounts starting in the late 1920s. I examine in detail Carnap’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts between 1929 and 1932, their connections, and the arguments put forward in favour of them. Presenting their rather similar views as well as their rather different motivations and background assumptions casts further light on the emergence of physicalism in the early thirties, and possibly also on Wittgenstein's troubled relationship with Carnap.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,551

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Physicalism and Relativity.Jules Vuillemin - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1):313-326.
Physicalism and Relativity.Jules Vuillemin - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1):313-326.
Wittgenstein & het logisch empiricisme. Een gespannen verhouding.Fons Dewulf - 2023 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 115 (2):180-195.
Otto Neurath on the Structure of Protocol Sentences; A New Approach to an Interpretative Puzzle.Nikola Nottelmann - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):165-186.
Carnap's Theories of Confirmation.Pierre Wagner - 2011 - In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. Springer. pp. 477--486.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-10-17

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gergely Ambrus
Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references