Abstract

This paper explores the relevance of exemplarity to virtue argumentation theory. It does so by using the law as both an illustrative and a normative example. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it argues that exemplars make a virtue theory of argumentation more robust in that (a) they are central to virtue education; (b) they help flesh out a richer account of the argumentative virtues; (c) they provide the theory with a normative standard that has some distinctive and attractive features; and (d) they make the theory less vulnerable to the objection from action guidance. Next, it develops an account of argumentative exemplars that encompass a diversity of character traits besides argumentative virtues. Third, it argues that the law provides exemplars of argumentative virtue that are central for further developing a virtue theory of argumentation and shaping the argumentative public culture. It concludes with some suggestions for further research in virtue exemplarism about argumentation.