Integral Approach And Ontological Vision

Al-Daleel 1 (1):107-137 (2017)
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Abstract

This article offers a serious analytical study of systematic thinking process to get to the highest universal facts, which are called as the universal vision or philosophical vision that constitutes man’s cognitive belief about this existence. The aim of this study is to offer a view on positive methodological behavior in the process of building the doctrinal system by making use of all cognitive tools, and to make the most use of its data in proving the existential realities, and provide a real discussion of the contradiction between them. We also try, in this study, to get to a clear vision in making the cognitive tools integrative and not destructive, through the reference to their only authentic source, which is reason; the absolute scientific perceptual dominating tool in all levels of thought. Through the various tools of knowledge, we can define the paths of making the universal doctrinal vision. In the first rank of faith, we have only the judgments of reason independent of any other tool; otherwise, we are faced by the imperatives of period, sequence, and the impossibility of getting to required certainty. As to the second rank, we can depend on two tools; the first is sense to prove the claim of prophethood by seeing the miracle or relying on recurrent traditions, and the second is to depend on text in proving the supernatural world in details. However, all that should be under the shade of reason and its judgments, for any other tool has no independence in any judgment; because they all depend, in their authenticity, on reason.

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