Abstract

The problems that arise for analyses of belief ascriptions pose one of the greatest impediments to an adequate semantic theory. My dissertation offers a novel solution to these well-known problems. What I have developed is a version of the believed-world approach to the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. Believed-world theories make use of the notion of a person's associated believed world, or a set of worlds compatible with what a person believes, in their semantic theories. Typically, semantic content of ascription 'that'-clauses is determined by the reference or denotation of complement sentence expressions in the believed worlds associated with the believer in question, according to such theories. The first half of my dissertation presents an argument in support of the believed world approach to the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. I argue that any adequate semantic theory must imply that the semantic content of ascription 'that'-clauses is a function of who belief is ascribed to. This conclusion undermines many of the linguistic theories that have been defended in the literature. Moreover, I argue that linguistic theories which can accommodate this result, such as the view recently defended by Crimmins, run into serious modal difficulties. The second half of my dissertation presents a novel version of the believed world approach to semantics, which, I argue, is superior to competing believed world theories. The advantage of my theory lies in the account I give of the nature of believed worlds and my explanation of how actual token occurrences of expressions can have referents in believed worlds. On my view, objects in believed worlds can share spatio-temporal parts with actual objects. Moreover, if we suppose, as I do, that reference to an object is achieved by means of a causal relation between a spatio-temporal part of the object and a referring expression, reference to objects in believed worlds becomes manageable. It can proceed by means of causal relations between referring expressions and those spatio-temporal parts common to actual objects and objects in believed worlds