Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa

Ars Disputandi 5:5-11 (2005)
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Abstract

Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy . According to Trakakis and Nagasawa, we are mistaken in our claim that the sceptical theist response to evidential arguments from evil is unacceptable because it would undermine ordinary moral reasoning. In their view, there is no good reason to think that sceptical theism leads to an objectionable form of moral scepticism. We disagree. In this paper, we explain why we think that the argument of Nagasawa and Trakakis fails to overthrow our objection to sceptical theism.

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Author Profiles

Graham Oppy
Monash University
Mike Almeida
University of Texas at San Antonio

Citations of this work

Skeptical theism.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
Skeptical theism and moral obligation.Stephen Maitzen - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2):93 - 103.
Skeptical theism and value judgments.David James Anderson - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (1):27-39.
Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Deception.Joshua Seigal - 2010 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (2):251-274.

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