Atomism about value

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):312 – 331 (2004)
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Abstract

Atomism is defined as the view that the moral value of any object is ultimately determined by simple features whose contribution to the value of an object is always the same, independently of context. A morally fundamental feature, in a given context, is defined as one whose contribution in that context is determined by no other value fact. Three theses are defended, which together entail atomism: (1) All objects have their moral value ultimately in virtue of morally fundamental features; (2) If a feature is morally fundamental, then its contribution is always the same; (3) Morally fundamental features are simple

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David Alm
Lund University

Citations of this work

Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An argument for agent-neutral value.David Alm - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):249–263.

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References found in this work

Moral reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Philosophy 6 (22):236-240.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1932 - The Monist 42:157.
The right and the good.W. Ross - 1932 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 39 (2):11-12.

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