The Metaphysical Subject and Logical Space: Solipsism and Singularity in the Tractatus

Open Philosophy 1 (1):277-289 (2018)
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Abstract

This essay presents a heterodox reading of the issue of solipsism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, out of which the whole of the TLP can be re-read. Inspired by, though not dependent on, the themes of virtuality and singularity found in Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’, Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘logical space’ is here complexly related to the paradoxes of the ‘metaphysical subject’ and ‘solipsism,’ within which the strictures of sense are defined, and through which the logico-pictorial scaffolding of the TLP precipitates its own systematic dissolution. It shows how nonsense envelopes not only not idle chatter, and metaphysical confusion, but sense itself.

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M. Curtis Allen
University of Western Ontario

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References found in this work

On Wittgenstein's `solipsism'.Jaakko Hintikka - 1958 - Mind 67 (265):88-91.
Transcendental idealism in Wittgenstein's tractatus.Hao Tang - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):598-607.
Wittgenstein: Science and religion.Rom Harré - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (2):211-237.
Wittgenstein.Mark Wilson - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (2):289-316.

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