Locating Thought Insertion on the Map of Ordinary Thinking

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3):235-238 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In her account of thought insertion, Pedrini follows the prevailing view that it is an error about ‘who is thinking a thought.’ This view is based on a particular characterization of thinking as analogous to physical actions, where an object can be made, possessed, moved about, and put in and out of containers. This picture is well-suited for explaining thought insertion where the speaker talks of having the thoughts of others put into his mind. The question, ‘Who is thinking?’ can then be answered in at least two ways, as the person who has or possesses the thought, or the person who produces it. This leads into discussions about agency and its criteria. This move is understandable as part of a...

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,248

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rescuing the "Loss-Of-Agency" Account of Thought Insertion.Patrizia Pedrini - 2015 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (3):221-233.
Thought insertion and the inseparability thesis.Paul J. Gibbs - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.
Thought insertion without thought.Shivam Patel - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (3):955-973.
Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):523-539.
Are Alien Thoughts Beliefs?Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):134-148.
Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-04-17

Downloads
48 (#468,707)

6 months
8 (#605,717)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

A Modified Self-Knowledge Model of Thought Insertion.Sruthi Rothenfluch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):157-181.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references