Abstract

This thesis is about animal minds: which have them, and how we can know that. There are two phases in my approach. I first consider attitudinal states, especially beliefs, before turning to phenomenal consciousness. In my view, these topics are deeply related. Consciousness is best understood as the use of sensory information in cognition. There is nothing that it is like to be an animal which is not capable of a certain kind of belief. ;In order to keep this work manageable I decided at a very early stage to embrace "chimpophobia" , for the most part setting aside consideration of the minds of higher primates. It seems to me that the primates raise issues which, while important, add a further dimension of complexity which would lead away from a discussion of simple perceptual attitudes. As such the role of communication, "theory of mind" issues, including deception, and social cognition in general, as well as disputes about primate culture, and especially the ape language controversy, are largely ignored here. ;Chapter one criticizes excessively permissive views about ascribing attitudes to animals. The second chapter explores the themes of adaptive versatility and parsimony, especially in the form of Morgan's canon. There I also address sceptical worries about the possibility of animal belief. Chapter three assesses the unique contributions of Dennett, and uses his work as a springboard into a discussion of animal consciousness. Recent sceptical arguments he offers about bats and snakes are also answered. The final chapter is exclusively devoted to a discussion of consciousness. I argue that the phenomenon of blindsight suggests a number of heretofore unnoticed, but important, revisions in our thinking about phenomenal subjectivity: Higher-order representational theories of consciousness are poorly motivated, Lower-order theories are in need of an important refinement, some, but not all, animals are a kind of natural zombie. ;1The title of this work is derived from a parody of Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Women usually attributed to Thomas Taylor. It will soon become apparent to the reader that I wish to turn the tables on Taylor