Is Construct Validation Valid?

Philosophy of Science 83 (5):1098-1109 (2016)
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Abstract

What makes a measure of well-being valid? The dominant approach today, construct validation, uses psychometrics to ensure that questionnaires behave in accordance with background knowledge. Our first claim is interpretive—construct validation obeys a coherentist logic that seeks to balance diverse sources of evidence about the construct in question. Our second claim is critical—while in theory this logic is defensible, in practice it does not secure valid measures. We argue that the practice of construct validation in well-being research is theory avoidant, favoring a narrow focus on statistical tests while largely ignoring relevant philosophical considerations.

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Author Profiles

Dan Haybron
Saint Louis University
Anna Alexandrova
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Can Machines Read our Minds?Christopher Burr & Nello Cristianini - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (3):461-494.
Construct validity in psychological tests – the case of implicit social cognition.Uljana Feest - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
Measuring the non-existent: validity before measurement.Kino Zhao - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (2):227–244.
Measurement in Science.Eran Tal - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Old and New Problems in Philosophy of Measurement.Eran Tal - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1159-1173.
Subjective measures of well-being: Philosophical perspectives.Erik Angner - 2009 - In Don Ross & Harold Kincaid, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 560--579.

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