Abstract

In this dissertation, I evaluate the coherence of Nietzsche's thought given a logical elaboration of the implications entailed by his embryonic insights into perspectivism, genealogy, and differential analysis. I argue that, given these, Nietzsche's critique of western culture is flawed in that it is based on two assumptions which the above show to be illegitimate: that life has certain perspective-independent features that can function as transcultural standards by which to measure the biological worth of any given form and of their respective values; and that he has privileged access to these features. I go on to argue that this conflict between the critical/epistemic dimension of his thinking--i.e., those elements that elaborate his anti-dogmatism--and that forming his cultural criticism--in fact, a distinctly apocalyptic, salvational and thus dogmatic dimension--is not only irreducible, but severely compromises the integrity of his thought. Furthermore, I argue that, under the assumption that dogmatic positions are internally compromised if one is interested in generating a philosophically defensible point of view out of Nietzsche's thought, rather than examine it as a piece of intellectual history, one must move to excise from it those elements which are inconsistent with its anti-dogmatic, anti-metaphysical, and anti-foundational elements. This, I argue, generates a philosophical position which, though limited in scope, provides one with a justifiable account of the human world, one which in many respects reflects the self-understanding of postmodern microcommunitarian