Defining agency after implicit bias

Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):645-656 (2017)
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Abstract

Recent findings in empirical psychology show that implicit biases can affect behavior in ways that are difficult to control deliberatively. Doris argues that findings like these constitute a threat to agency, if agency is defined as the ability to reflectively, deliberatively direct one’s actions. I argue, however, that implicit biases pose no fundamental threat to agency since they can be brought under indirect deliberative control, whereby deliberative, reflective actions put in place automatic processes that automatically inhibit unwanted biases. Since automatic processes can be thus used to achieve deliberatively, reflectively endorsed goals, agency should be defined as the ability to act in line with reflectively endorsed goals, whether by deliberative or automatic processes.

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References found in this work

Skepticism about persons.John M. Doris - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.
Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity.Nancy Snow - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):545-561.
Soft selves and ecological control.Andy Clark - 2007 - Distributed Cognition and the Will:101–22.

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