Mathematical Deduction by Induction

Gratia Eruditionis:4-12 (2013)
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Abstract

In attempt to provide an answer to the question of origin of deductive proofs, I argue that Aristotle’s philosophy of math is more accurate opposed to a Platonic philosophy of math, given the evidence of how mathematics began. Aristotle says that mathematical knowledge is a posteriori, known through induction; but once knowledge has become unqualified it can grow into deduction. Two pieces of recent scholarship on Greek mathematics propose new ways of thinking about how mathematics began in the Greek culture. Both claimed there was a close relationship between the culture and mathematicians; mathematics was understood through imaginative processes, experiencing the proofs in tangible ways, and establishing a consistent unified form of argumentation. These pieces of evidence provide the context in which Aristotle worked and their contributions lend support to the argument that mathematical premises as inductively available is a better way of understanding the origins of deductive practices, opposed to the Platonic tradition.

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Christy Ailman
Azusa Pacific University

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