Sense Experience and its Relation to Universality and Induction

Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 16 (unknown)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this article, and with an epistomological approach, the philosopher, presents a new and strange explanation about the nature of experience, formation and origination of experience, and construction of "the universal" in mind. In light of his doctrine, he disprove well-knoun doctrines, such as Karl Poppeirs falifiablity doctrine and Kant's doctrine. He challenges the common definition of "the universal" and believes that many issues, such as the experimental knowledge, the criterion of truth and induction, will find new forms. According to him the experimental knowledge is resulted from the first sensing contact with the external object, together with the identity principle.The first experience will have essential, natural, existential, causal and effectual validity; and it is the cornerstone of experimental knowledge. According to him. the criterion of truth in sense and experience, is sense-organs, in the first step. And in contrary with common definition, induction never proves a universal proposition.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,323

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-12

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references