Hale on some arguments for the necessity of necessity

Mind 109 (433):81-91 (2000)
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Abstract

The paper argues against Bob Hale's (1999) argument that enquirers must regard some truths as necessary truths. Hale's argument against Quinean skepticism. like many similar arguments due to McFetridge, Wright and others, involves a quantifier shift fallacy.

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Arif Ahmed
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Against Reflective Equilibrium for Logical Theorizing.Jack Woods - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):319.
A new revisability paradox.Daniel Y. Elstein - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):308–318.

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References found in this work

The problem of counterfactual conditionals.Nelson Goodman - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (5):113-128.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.
Conditionals.Ernest W. Adams - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):433.

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