Don’t Look Now

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):327-350 (2019)
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Abstract

Good’s theorem is the apparent platitude that it is always rational to ‘look before you leap’: to gather information before making a decision when doing so is free. We argue that Good’s theorem is not platitudinous and may be false. And we argue that the correct advice is rather to ‘make your act depend on the answer to a question’. Looking before you leap is rational when, but only when, it is a way to do this.

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Author Profiles

Arif Ahmed
Cambridge University
Bernhard Salow
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.
Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance.David Kinney & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):35-57.
The Value of Evidence in Decision-Making.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.

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