Prioritarianism: A response to critics

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Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (2):101-144 (2019)
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Abstract

Prioritarianism is a moral view that ranks outcomes according to the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of individual well-being. Prioritarianism is ‘welfarist’ (namel...

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10.1177/1470594x19828022

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original Holtug, Nils (2019) "Prioritarianism: Ex Ante, Ex Post, or Factualist Criterion of Rightness?". Journal of Political Philosophy 27(2):207-228

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Author Profiles

Nils Holtug
University of Copenhagen
Matthew D. Adler
Duke University

Citations of this work

Modelling in Normative Ethics.Joe Roussos - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (5):1-25.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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