Updating Thought Theory: Emotion and the Non‐Paradox of Fiction

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):1055-1073 (2019)
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Abstract

Over the past four decades, the paradox of fiction has sparked considerable debate among philosophers. Unfortunately, the most promising solution to this puzzle, thought theory, currently earns its plausibility by way of intuition rather than evidence. I aim to address this by updating thought theory in light of recent empirical findings on affect. I will draw upon a wide range of scientific research—on the cognitive mechanisms driving emotion, the role of affect in counterfactual mind wandering and prospection, and the evolutionary function of affect—to substantiate the claim that fictions can give rise to both real and rational emotional states.

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Heather Adair
Susquehanna University

Citations of this work

Emotion in Fiction: State of the Art.Stacie Friend - 2022 - British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (2):257-271.

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References found in this work

The emotions: a philosophical introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2008 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Fabrice Teroni.
An argument for basic emotions.Paul Ekman - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3):169-200.
Fearing fictions.Kendall L. Walton - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):5-27.
The expression of feeling in imagination.Richard Moran - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):75-106.

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