The Theoretical and the PracticalIntention.Thought and Action.An Analysis of Knowing.Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Personal Knowledge [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 13 (4):642-662 (1960)
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Abstract

Perhaps the central categories of the practical area are 'intention' and 'intentional action.' As Hampshire says, "The notion of the will, of action, the relation of thought and action, the relation of a person's mind and body, the difference between observing a convention or rule and merely having a habit--all these problems find their meeting place in the notion of intention". Certainly if 'intention' and 'intentional action' are clarified the whole practical field will be illuminated. Miss Anscombe thinks that 'intention' itself can best be got at by concentrating on 'intentional action.'

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