Abstract

The focus of this dissertation is on the American commonsense philosophers in the first half of the nineteenth century. The primary issue dealt with is the agency theory of these philosophers and how that related to the debate concerning freedom and determinism. The essential Americans in this debate are Alexander Campbell, Asa Mahan, Henry Tappan, and Thomas Upham. Each one was committed to the fundamental principles of the commonsense philosophy, and so supported the view that man acts freely. They were important in clarifying and furthering this position. ;Although the Americans are the center of this discussion, it is necessary to understand the input of Thomas Reid. As the founder of the commonsense school it is important to deal with his metaphysics and metaphilosophy to understand what is being done with agency theory. Hence the thought of Reid is presented where that will illuminate what his American followers are doing. Reid believed we have determination over our will. This is a dictate of commonsense, as technically defined by Reid, and is what any theory has to account for. Reid and his American counterparts then argue against the determinists, show where they make their mistakes, and also present their own theory, agent causality, to show how acting freely is possible. ;Reid's philosophy has received much attention over the past several decades. However this has not been the case with the Americans in the commonsense tradition. This dissertation will help to fill a vacancy that is generally present in the history of American philosophy. ;The Americans attempted to show that the determinist, since he denies a principle of commonsense, is mistaken. Campbell and Mahan argued against hard and soft determinism. Tappan's most significant contribution is in presenting an agent causality view and thereby clarifying the difference between motives and causes. He showed the determinist is mistaken in believing motives are causes and that one therefore acts according to the strongest motive. Upham believed we act freely, but rejected agent causality as being an inadequate explanation of that. However his own view turns out to be very much like agent causality