Googled Assertion

Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501 (2017)
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Abstract

Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.

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Author Profiles

Emma C. Gordon
University of Glasgow
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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