The Constitution Argument Against Conceptualism

Sorites 20:49-66 (2008)
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Abstract

According to philosophers such as McDowell and Brewer, the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual. This view came to be known as Conceptualism. However, a number of critics have argued that they are wrong in thinking this, for they claim that there is an argument, the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which is valid and sound, and has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism. Although McDowell and Brewer seem to acknowledge that the Fineness of Grain Argument, if valid and sound, has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism, they have ways of answering to the argument. In this paper, I will grant the proponents of Conceptualism that one of their ways of answering to the Fineness of Grain Argument is successful, and that the argument can be blocked. But I will argue that, even if this is the case, we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. For there is another argument, that I will call the Constitution Argument, that has as its conclusion the falsity of Conceptualism. I show that the Constitution Argument is valid and sound, in which case we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false

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Andre Abath
Federal University of Minas Gerais

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