Abstract

The article reveals peculiarities of conceptual analysis of the “Critique of Pure Reason» by British philosopher Peter Strawson. The author claims that this analysis depends on the meth-odological assumptions and conceptual language of Strawson’s previously published large-scale study. The author confirms Barry Straud`s point that Strawson`s project depends, to some extent, on the descriptive metaphysics of “Critique of Pure Reason”. Strawson`s metaphysical doctrine is based not only on the Kant`s doctrine of subjective forms of space-time, but also on some subjects of Kant`s transcendental logic. In particular, it relates to Strawson`s analysis of: the intel-lectual structures, that actively shape our understanding of the world; the functioning of logic-grammatical forms that provide predication of experience; the transcendental unity of “I” and of the difference between personal and formally-analytical aspects of “I”. Based on “The Bounds of Sense...” and later Strawson’s articles dealing with the philosophy of Kant, the author proves that: Strawson’s «analytical model» of transcendental argument is based on Kant's transcendental psychology; the modalities of understanding of the transcendental idealism depend on understanding of relation between things in themselves and phenomena i.e. depend on the empirical realism according to Kant; Kant’s sensual intuition suggests, as Strawson has shown, the possibility of other spatial-temporal forms of subjective intuition, which are constitutive for another kinds of experience.