I selectively summarize some of the main ideas in my book Why We Doubt, focusing on the elements that are discussed in the replies from commentators. In the book, I investigated our skeptical intuitions which form the basis of the skeptic’s arguments. I argue that these intuitive judgments or inclinations to judge are produced by the deployment of a subconscious heuristic, pbs, which serves us well most of the time but misfires in esoteric cases like those associated with global skepticism. (...) I do this by identifying the rational function of pbs and arguing that when we apply this rational function to global skepticism, it doesn’t yield a skeptical result. (shrink)

I respond to comments from Branden Fitelson, Chad Gonnerman and John Waterman, and Mark Walker. My response to Fitelson concerns how we should understand the notion of “sensitivity” which is central to my account of why we find skeptical premises intuitive. I argue against his recommendation except for a specific type of “loose” skeptical hypothesis. Gonnerman and Waterman push me to say more about the conditions under which we feel or not feel the skeptical pull. I clarify and expand on (...) the theory presented in the book. Finally, Walker presents a new type of skeptical challenge. To deal with this challenge, I distinguish between two types of skeptical hypotheses, a mild and more substantial one. Walker’s skeptical argument concerns mild skepticism. My account is aimed at more substantial accounts. However, I speculate about how we may respond to this challenge. (shrink)

Exegetical scepticism is a strand of scepticism about meaning running through the German Enlightenment. This paper provides the first modern account of its tenets, critics, and proponents, and argues that it shares essential features with modern varieties of meaning-scepticism that have been a preoccupation among philosophers of language since the middle of the twentieth century. I argue that exegetical scepticism is a type of epistemological scepticism first introduced as a philosophical position in a theological debate between August Pfeiffer (1640–1698) and (...) Philipp Jacob Spener (1635–1705). Under contention, so I argue, was the idea that interpretation is never certain because it is necessarily underdetermined by the evidence. Following the effects of this controversy, I show that exegetical scepticism caused a great deal of unrest in German letters in the eighteenth century and can be seen to contribute to the great proliferation of hermeneutical theories in the Aufklärung, indeed to the very birth of hermeneutics as a standalone discipline. Bringing this type of scepticism to contemporary attention supports a reassessment of issues at the heart of meaning-scepticism and hermeneutics itself, and a reconsideration of the histories of Enlightenment scepticism and hermeneutics. (shrink)