Can it be ethical to conduct xenotransplant research on a human brain‐dead decedent (HB‐DD) whose organs could otherwise be given to persons in need? The ethical consensus is that it is better to save existing persons via organ donation than to devote a HB‐DD to research that will not directly benefit anyone. I argue otherwise. Given how rapidly xenotransplant research is progressing, and its clinical promise in the next couple of years or decades, I argue that it can be ethical (...) to conduct xenotransplant research on a HB‐DD whose organs could otherwise be given to individuals in need. (shrink)

Opponents of legalised assisted dying often assert that palliative care is worse in countries where assisted dying has been legalised, and imply that legalised assisted dying makes palliative care worse. This study considers five versions of this claim: that it is difficulty to access expert palliative care in countries where assisted dying has been legalised, that those countries rank low in their quality of end‐of‐life care; that legalising assisted dying doesn't expand patient choice in respect of palliative care; that growth (...) in palliative care services has stalled in countries where assisted dying has been legalised; and that legalised assisted dying impedes the growth of palliative care or causes it to decline. In each case, it concludes that neither argumentation nor evidence supports these claims. (shrink)

Since its launch in November 2022, ChatGPT has become a global phenomenon, sparking widespread public interest in chatbot artificial intelligences (AIs) generally. While not approved for medical use, it is capable of passing all three United States medical licensing exams and offers diagnostic accuracy comparable to a human doctor. It seems inevitable that it, and tools like it, are and will be used by the general public to provide medical diagnostic information or treatment plans. Before we are taken in by (...) the promise of a golden age for chatbot medical AIs, it would be wise to consider the implications of using these tools as either supplements to, or substitutes for, human doctors. With the rise of publicly available chatbot AIs, there has been a keen focus on research into the diagnostic accuracy of these tools. This, however, has left a notable gap in our understanding of the implications for health outcomes of these tools. Diagnosis accuracy is only part of good health care. For example, crucial to positive health outcomes is the doctor–patient relationship. This paper challenges the recent focus on diagnostic accuracy by drawing attention to the causal relationship between doctor–patient relationships and health outcomes arguing that chatbot AIs may even hinder outcomes in numerous ways including subtracting the elements of perception and observation that are crucial to clinical consultations. The paper offers brief suggestions to improve chatbot medical AIs so as to positively impact health outcomes. (shrink)

This study examines the ethical permissibility of biomedical moral enhancement (BME) for psychopaths, considering both coercive and voluntary approaches. To do so, I will first briefly explain what psychopaths are and some normative implications of these facts. I will then ethically examine three scenarios of BME for psychopaths: (1) coercive BME for non‐criminal psychopaths, (2) coercive BME for psychopathic offenders, and (3) voluntary BME for psychopathic offenders. I will argue that coercive BME for non‐criminal psychopaths is ethically problematic due to (...) issues of cost, invasion of privacy, and stigmatic effects of compulsory diagnosis. Similarly, I will argue that coercive BME for criminals is impermissible due to violations of the rights to bodily and mental integrity. However, I will show that voluntary BME for offenders may be ethically permissible under certain conditions, challenging the critique that the consent of vulnerable prisoners cannot be considered fully voluntary. I argue that when an offender is provided with sufficient medical and legal information, incentives such as the possibility of parole review based on BME results do not preclude the voluntariness of consent. Ultimately, I aim to advance the debate on BME for psychopaths by delineating and defending conditions for the ethical permissibility of voluntary BME. (shrink)