The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | but on my version of "a priori" | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: nominalism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Lean toward: objective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Lean toward: yes | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept both | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept more than one | Levels of 'reality', again, all true in their own way | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept: libertarianism | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: theism | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept both | Nearly all of my answers are "lean toward" even when it is not an option. I love wisdom and being wholly certain of some things does not seem wise to me. | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | There is no fact of the matter | I hate -isms, and I gather some others are with me on that. They never quite capture our views. You'd be better to create a quiz with yes/no questions e.g."is classical logic the only valid form currently expressed?" Perhaps allow the -isms as options for those few who would espouse the exact views. You might actually get better truth out of our views. For the theism views, you may as well just ask for religious/spiritual affiliation as a drop-down box | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept both | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept both | | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Lean toward: moral realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept both | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Accept more than one | I have a foot in all of these, I think | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Lean toward: qualia theory | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Lean toward: further-fact view | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept more than one | Again, there is more distinction to many of my views than can be captured in a particular -ism | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Lean toward: Fregean | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | There is no fact of the matter | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Accept another alternative | Switch and YELL--the response of which is that person is deaf and no one else can possibly move to save either. Just ask if I'd be willing to be the actor in a utilitarian "end game". The answer is yes, I would. I'm relatively Kantian. | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |