The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | My views on a priori knowledge resemble those of Gödel. | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: Platonism | Like that of Cantor and Gödel | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept: objective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept another alternative | I endorse Quine's approach | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept: non-skeptical realism | including Gödel's mathematical realism | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Lean toward: compatibilism | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Lean toward: theism | I mean theism in Cantor-style | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept: rationalism | What I really believe can be called empirio-rationalism in a pragmatist vein. | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: contextualism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Lean toward: non-Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept: classical | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Lean toward: moral realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Lean toward: non-naturalism | in Gödel's spirit | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Lean toward: non-physicalism | In this question, I follow Gödel's arguments | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept another alternative | I accept Gödel's 1931 and Turing's 1939 approach | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Accept another alternative | I do not think that consequentialism has to oppose deontology, as one may choose between consequences being led by a sense of duty. | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Skip | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept more than one | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Lean toward: Fregean | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Lean toward: correspondence | in Tarski's sense | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |