The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | suuitably defined | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept both | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | Neither counterexamples nor shifting boundaries eliminate the underlying distinction | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | when I earlier answered 'rational and empiricism' I probably revealed my answer to this question as well-but am insufficiently familiar | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept: non-skeptical realism | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept: compatibilism | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: atheism | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept both | accept both but since empiricism is always present rationalism (whichh is not always present)is the independent variable | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | The question is too unclear to answer | As often, I don't see the necessary incompatibility of these views-particularly the first two options seem compatible depending on the (kind of) knowledge claim in question | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Lean toward: non-Humean | lean heavily-re: historical a priori | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | inclined towards ecumenical view but am insufficiently familiar | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Lean toward: naturalism | Lean rather then accept because I may not fully grasp the issue | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept both | ecumenical views often seem most plausible
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Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | I think moral judgments very often motivate but need not do so necessarily (therefore I lean) | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Accept more than one | accept elements of all views with special place accorded to consequentialism-only it seems to me capable of holding up mostly on its own | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | I probably would accept ecumenical versions of all three views-but am insufficiently familiar with the details | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept: egalitarianism | obviously while keeping many of the commitments of the other two options at a fairly abstract level | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific realism | About the most justified scientific theories- obviously not all of them! | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Accept: switch | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept more than one | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Lean toward: metaphysically possible | But the issue (if I get it) is not one of possibility but of probability-compare theism- | |