The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | We can absolutely ascertain certain truths without experience. | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept: Platonism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept: subjective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Lean toward: skepticism | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Lean toward: compatibilism | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: atheism | There can be no proof of god. I agnostically accept that there may be a god, but reject that we can ever know the truth of this matter. | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept: empiricism | To know, we must see, unless the knowledge is a priori (known by definition). | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept: classical | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept both | We are both subjective and objective animals. | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Lean toward: moral realism | I accept error theory, but believe there is truth in social facts. | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Lean toward: naturalism | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Lean toward: physicalism | There is something inherent to the subjective self, but it is likely explainable using mental processes. | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept an intermediate view | There is truth to social facts, but they are dependent on there being a "society" | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | Motivations and intentions are internal. | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Accept: virtue ethics | Good character will lead to good actions, good motivations, and good intentions. | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept: psychological view | We are who we decide we are. | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Lean toward: egalitarianism | Strongly Platonic. The simple life is the most desirable, but if we must have our luxuries, then let us be equal to our functions. | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Accept: Fregean | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific realism | Science is directly related to empirical reality. Everything else is metaphysical. | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Accept: death | You are a new entity, and there is no way that the "you" that was destroyed is the "you" that is created. The teletransporter cannot perfectly reconstruct the perfect copy. | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Accept: switch | Dr. Foot's problem requires a solution that saves lives. The more the merrier. | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept: epistemic | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | | |