The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept: Platonism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept: objective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept: non-skeptical realism | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept: libertarianism | of the agent causation variety. | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: theism | but reject all religions. | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept: rationalism | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: invariantism | I reject the idea of special philosophical contexts for knowledge. Haven't fully ruled out the possibility of more mundane shifts in contexts. | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: non-Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Skip | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral realism | It is wrong to toss babies into wood chippers. | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept: non-naturalism | I take the world as I find it: full of minds, and numbers, and irreducible moral properties, and other wonderful things. | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: non-physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | I think being motivated by what is right or good is essential to moral agency. However, I don't see why there couldn't be a creature who could recognize moral facts but fail to be motivated by them. I just wouldn't call such a creature a moral agent. | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Accept: two boxes | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Reject all | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Skip | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept: further-fact view | Minds, souls, spirits, whatever you want to call 'em. | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept: libertarianism | I'm reading this as about how to prioritize political values (equality, community, individual liberty). | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Lean toward: death | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Skip | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Accept: switch | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept: correspondence | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Lean toward: metaphysically possible | Want to say accept, but since I'm a realist about causation, a libertarian, and an interactive dualist, I'm not certain there is a consistent set of laws that could replicate our behavior without the influence of a mind. | |