The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Reject both | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Other | would reject the alternatives provided as being based on a false premise. | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Reject both | The determination of aesthetic value, as well as ethical, whether objective or subjective is based on dubious premises... | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Reject both | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Reject both | If these are the only alternatives, I tend to think Descartes is correct. | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Reject all | Again, the choices are based on the premise that reason is a matter of logical argument. I would question this premise in order to argue that these alternatives need not be accepted. | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Reject all | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: theism | again, the question depends on what one means by "God." | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Reject both | again, the alternative is based on a false, or rather, a dubious set of premises... | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Reject all | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Reject both | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Reject both | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Reject both | | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Reject both | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept another alternative | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Reject both | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Reject both | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Reject both | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Reject all | again, the choices here are based on a dubious premise. | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Reject all | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Reject all | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Reject all | Even this dispute relies on the same premise involving the account of reason as a matter of logical argument. | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Reject both | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Reject both | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Reject all | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | The question is too unclear to answer | Depends on what one means by zombie. Hume's account of people as some combo of the reasons and passions just is a good account of people as zombies...will-less creatures driven by their hungers and the commands of their masters. | |