The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Lean toward: subjective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Reject one, undecided between others | it would be idiotic to completely accept non skeptical realism. That said, adjudicating between Bishop berkely and variants requires way more work than I have done so far. | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Reject one, undecided between others | reject no free will | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept another alternative | What happened to pantheism? | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept both | Both a priori and a posteriori knowledge is possible | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Lean toward: one box | More has to be specified about the nature of the predictor. The mere fact that he has been 100% accurate so far (without any specification on how many times he as guessed) has no bearing on whether or not he will always be accurate. However, in the case of indeterminacy,cf rawls in the original position, maximin is the answer | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: deontology | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Lean toward: libertarianism | Depends on the type of libertarianism. Moderaate, Hard-core or Anarcho-capitalism. cf Bryan Caplan's libertarianism survey. | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific realism | Institutional biases speaking here (faculty of science) | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: don't switch | How to balance between number of lives lost and act/omission distinction. Also, would definitely reject survival lottery | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept: correspondence | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Agnostic/undecided | It may be prima facie conceivable, but not conceivable in the deep sense. i.e Given a full understanding of what having the same physical apparatus means, it is not clear that we can actually conceive of one who is physically identical, but lacks qualia. To say it is either conceivable or not presupposes the conclusion.
Also depending on your definition of conceivable and metaphysically possible, that it is metaphysically possible may or may not follow. | |