Germ-line genetic engineering procedures may influence the lives of untold millions of people far into the future. These techniques change the genetic material that is passed on to offspring and thus have the potential to change the human race as we know it. Because the effects are so enduring, this powerful technique must be used with caution. We must decide how to ethically evaluate potential changes to the germ-line consistently and effectively so that future generations are not harmed. I will (...) show that a concept of traits that any rational person would find desirable in themselves and others (whatever the situation), known as primary goods, is necessary to justify germ-line genetic enhance-ments. Without primary goods, a genetic engineer is in no position to determine which traits should or should not be passed on to future generations. One must then create a list of universally acceptable primary goods and convincing evidence that germ-line genetic pro-cedures will augment them. I will show that the strongest conception of primary goods not only fails to support germ-line enhancements, but provides a compelling argument against it. Primary goods are difficult to enumerate given the variety of unexpected situations a person may encounter in life. However, those making decisions as to which characteristics are transmitted to progeny would have to comparatively evaluate the desirability of different traits. These decisions must be made based on primary goods. Rawls’ list of natural primary goods includes health, intelligence, and self-respect. While listing primary goods is controversial, those who have tried have always mentioned self-respect, which, as I will explain, is prerequisite to enjoying any other goods in life and is the most important primary good for Rawls. I argue that germ-line enhancements, far from promoting primary goods, will threaten them. I begin by making three assumptions about issues central to the discussion of germ-line enhancements. 1) I assume that germ-line genetic engineering will be capable of enhancing human traits. 2) I assume that the definitions of traits such as intelligence can be taken at face value. 3) I finally assume that germ-line enhancements will be distributed justly without prompting a treatment of distributive justice. For the purposes of this discussion I will assume an optimistic view of the potential of genetic engineering to enhance human traits. Only time will tell what is possible through genetic engineering, but at present it is useful to discuss the subject as if it will be nearly omnipotent, since that is the circumstance that grants the most com-pelling arguments in favor of germ-line enhancement. (shrink)

In Section I, I analyze the first formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and the version of the moral self that this theory entails. In Section II, I demonstrate that Kant’s ethical theory dismisses as non-moral an agent who derives her sense of self from her particular context. I explain how the societal oppression of actual persons who understand their moral selves in this way leads feminists to reject Kant’s theory and to call for an alternative theory; I outline two criteria (...) that such a theory must meet. Then, in Section III, I consider a feminist alternative to universalist ethical theory, the ethics of care of Joan Tronto. I argue that care ethics entails a relational moral self, and posing two objections to this version of the self, I prove it to be an insufficient model for the feminist project at hand. In Section IV, I consider a second alternative moral theory, narrative ethics, analyzing the deliberative framework put forth by Margaret Urban Walker. Next, in Section V, I argue that the narrative moral self is captured by Walker’s concept of the moral persona. This narrative moral self is relational, yet uses certain skills, such as analytic or reasoning skills, in moral decision-making. Finally, in Section VI I argue that narrative theory is the most useful tool for feminists who seek to define the moral person in terms of her concrete relationships to others, and I answer several objections to narrative theory. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that we can chart such a middle course through an exploration of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought . I will use his thesis that meaning and certainty are context dependent to investigate how meaning is produced in science and in religion. I will start with the recognition that any system of thought must take certain basic propositions as criteria for further investigation and explore how Wittgenstein defines this idea. Next I will try to establish that religion (...) and science do, indeed, function as two different systems or language games by illustrating their differing criteria for truth. In so doing I will reference both Wittgenstein’s works and that of some anthropologists of religion, whose work has explored a definition of religion through its use, which mirrors Wittgenstein’s location of meaning. I will then discuss how we can pick between systems within a given context by requiring that a system stand up to the criteria of justification set up for that situation. (shrink)

In his landmark article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” W.V.O. Quine pushed analytical philosophy into its post-positivist phase by rejecting two central tenets of logical empiricism. The first dogma was the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements; the second was reductionism, or the belief that to each synthetic sentence there corresponds a set of experiences that will confirm or disconfirm it. But in both “Two Dogmas” and Word and Object, Quine stretches analytical philosophy to its limits. The problem is, ironically, his (...) adherence to two separate dogmas. The first stems from Quine’s empiricism: he insists that there is nothing more to meaning than the empirical method of discovering it. The second has been taken as the defining characteristic of analytical philosophy;2 it is the belief that a philosophical account of thought can only be attained through an account of language – the famed “linguistic turn.” I will argue that a philosophical account of language can only be attained given an account of thought,3 and that the philosophies of Kant and Davidson can help us construct such an account. (shrink)

This paper will define human enhancement and coercion in the context of this discussion; explain separately how Bioconservatives and Transhumanists use the concept of coercion; and demonstrate how coercion is used improperly as a critique of enhancement.

Evolutionary ethics is a discipline that has formed around the belief that human-kind’s conception of morality was developed through the evolutionary process of natural selection. Various mechanisms concern-ing the evolution of morality have been proposed within the theory of natural selection, and I believe that many authors in the field focus too narrowly on one or a few of them in their efforts to model the origins of morality. In this paper I hope to present a broader review of many (...) potential evolutionary mechanisms and the evidence supporting them, in an effort to show that they are not mutually exclusive and may have all played a role in the formation of components of the complex moral system that exists today. Many writers in the field of evolutionary ethics tend to focus too narrowly on either the biological mechanisms through which morality is proposed to have evolved, or else on the philosophical ramifications that an acceptance of evolutionary ethics would have for our current conception of morality. As I feel that both aspects are equally important for the proper understanding and application of evolutionary ethics I hope to give equal and detailed attention to both the biological theory and the resultant philosophical implications. (shrink)

One of the most difficult issues to sort out morally is our obligation to future generations. Most individuals feel that they do indeed have some kind of obligation, but face difficulty in explaining the exact nature of the obligation. For one, it seems impossible to know the wants and desires of future generations, and furthermore the existence of the persons we are obligated to is entirely dependent upon the choices that we in fact make. In essence, we could shape future (...) generations so that they desire exactly what we provide for them. It seems that no matter what principle we adopt that is based upon these potential individuals we are led to absurd conclusions. Gregory Kavka calls this moral grappling the Paradox of Future Individuals. I believe that the ethical concerns surrounding genetic engineering should be seen as a specific instantiation of this Paradox and that by examining both we may be able to come up with some sort of working solution. Derek Parfit pleads ignorance as to a solution to this Paradox after an extensive exegesis on the issue, but as we may not be that far from shopping a genetic supermarket to determine the characteristics of our children I don’t believe we can settle for that conclusion. We will begin by examining the Paradox and suggested solutions to the Paradox. Next I will address how the Paradox relates directly to genetic engineering and discuss how rights-based arguments aimed against genetic engineering fail because of the nature of identity. Then I will consider how David Heyd’s Genero-centric principle applies to genetic engineering specifically and how a modified version of that principle may guide us out of the Paradox of Future Individuals in general. This solution may not be acceptable to utilitarian sensibilities, but it is because the numbers don’t add up that we may need to appeal to a different principle entirely. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to i. briefly explain Nyaya dualist ontology and identify the implications involved in accepting this view, ii. provide a comparison of Nyaya dualism to Cartesian dualism, and iii. provide an analysis of Nyaya dualism vis-à-vis some contemporary non-dualist theories of mind, in an attempt to gauge the viability of Nyaya Dualism as a theory of mind. I will briefly identify the context and history of this school in Indian Philosophy and will attempt to describe how (...) this paper approaches and interprets Nyaya thinking. (shrink)

In order for us to associate a word with an object it might seem that we would need to have direct experience with both. Given the present technology, however, there are some objects with which we can have no direct experience, namely the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories. The problem taken up here is how to refer to those entities. There are two prominent attempts to explain reference in scientific theories – the first is Ramsey and Carnap’s proposal that (...) we exchange theoretical terms for variables and existential quantification. The second is Kripke and Evan’s causal theory of names and rigid designation. I will argue that the most plausible theory of reference to unobservables lies in between these two theories; terms that purport to refer to unobservable entities, when occurring within a theory, need to be thought of as bound variables. But when those same terms occur in sentences outside of the theory, as when spoken, for example, they occur as genuine referring expressions, which have their reference determined by a theory. (shrink)

Relatively recently, numerous philosophers of mind have espoused the epistemic intractability and impenetrability of both the mind-body problem and the problem of consciousness. While past and present attempts to theoretically resolve and circumvent these metaphysical questions have assumed many forms and postulated numerous conceptual paradigms (substance dualism, property dualism, eliminative materialism, functionalism, mind-body identity theory, logical behaviorism, idealism, etc.), the fundamental problem of epistemic inexplicability has not substantially dissipated since the rationalist ruminations of Descartes and Leibniz. The nascent articulation of (...) the epistemological insolvability of the mind-body problem that has so gravely and garishly confronted contemporary theorists of mind can, in fact, be found in the philosophical work of these two notable modernist thinkers. Thus, despite the curious anthropocentric tendency towards narrativizing human history as a teleological plot towards greater progress and enlightenment, in this paper I’d like to argue, by sketching out a historiography of the mind-body problem, however loose and inchoate, that the very philosophical problems, perplexities, and conundrums we still confront when addressing the link between consciousness and the physical workings of our neurophysiology haven’t really changed nor been radically reconceptualized since the epoch of Descartes and Leibniz. (shrink)

The contemporary development of naturalism has left us has in many ways ‘objectified’ our world, giving us a material world of laws and causes, that is in some ways strangely distant from our notions of ‘self.’ We might be said to possess a very strong ‘sense of self,’ and looking at our friends and neighbors, we get the impression that everybody holds similarly strong feelings. We live in a world populated by lumps of matter, but also rational agents, intricate persons, (...) and perhaps most importantly, centered around a self. How can naturalism, without invoking the Cartesian ego, account for our deeply held conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘person?’ To answer some of these troubling questions, we need to need to examine the origins of these important yet mysterious concepts. We would do well to take a survey of the environment and mechanism by which the concepts of ‘self’ and ‘person’ come into being and persist. I am speaking, of course, of the brain. Understanding the brain, especially in the context of its adaptation to the world through the process of natural selection, may be the key to figuring out where these concepts come from as well as what sort of structure they possess. (shrink)

I am very attracted to the theory Rawls has put forth in A Theory of Justice. I feel that he gives a good explanation of how principles of justice can to be arrived at in order to have a fair and just society. However, I do not think that Rawls’s way of doing this is the only way. In many ways, it seems that utilitarianism can be used to justify the same principles that Rawls is advocating. Specifically, it seems that (...) his notion of the veil of ignorance is just a tool used to decide principles in an essentially utilitarian manner. So, for the purpose of this paper, I will note the similarities between Rawls’s notion of the veil of ignorance and utilitarianism, and I will argue that by using this concept, Rawls is really advocating a kind of utilitarian reasoning. (shrink)

What role does translation play in philosophy of language? Recent development in the field has drawn parallels between theories of translation and theories of meaning, evident primarily in the work of Davidson and Quine. Communication has often been viewed as an act of translation or interpretation between speakers, particularly by Davidson in later writings. I think it is equally useful to view translation as an act of communication, and this approach is particularly valuable because it leads us to the conclusion (...) that meaning is created through dialectic processes. Although translation studies has recently emerged as a new and promising academic field, it usually separates philosophical analysis from literary criticism. Quine’s work is typical of the philosophical approach, which concerns itself with hypothetical translation situations. What is of importance in these cases is the general process of translation, separate from any specific language. Quine’s radical translation thought experiment involves an imagined language of which we had no “prior understanding.” Davidson considers this situation as well, but does not restrict himself to it. He is also interested in the actual problems of interpretation that occur between speakers, even if they are speakers of the same language. However, neither Quine nor Davidson deal with actual translation techniques for literary works, which are usually discussed only within the context of literary criticism. It is my contention that the philo-sophical significance of literary translation has for the most part been overlooked, and I hope to show that literary translation has something to contribute to the more general discussion of translation and meaning within philosophy of language. (shrink)

Most theories of metaphor look at what occurs inside a metaphorical phrase and posit a shift in meaning in the metaphorical words. This includes the classic “Models and Metaphor,” by Max Black, who distinguishes between the literal words of the phrase and the metaphorical words. On this view, the two interact in such a way that the meanings of the metaphorical words change. In another view, Donald Davidson takes a radical stance in his “What Metaphors Mean” to assert that the (...) words in a metaphor mean nothing other than their original, literal meaning. Both theories suffer from problems: Black fails to explain how the metaphorical words change in meaning. Davidson, on the other hand, while succeeding in refuting most of the “other meaning” theories, only weakly suggests “use” of metaphor to explain its power. In this paper, I will clarify the two respective theories and attempt to reconcile or fuse them. We will find that Black looks to the language itself and finds a shift in meaning, while Davidson asserts that meaning stays literal, and we must instead look at what occurs between the speaker and hearer. An examination of Davidson’s later theory of interpretation applied to Black’s theory of metaphor will clarify Davidson’s ‘use’ as well as allow for literal meaning to stay in metaphor. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s philosophical endeavor can be broadly characterized by two complementary ambitions acting throughout his corpus: a relentless critique of traditional metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology; and an effort to confront the nihilistic predicament which seems to result from these negations. Nowhere are these ideas more directly relevant and their implications more dramatic than in the discipline of philosophy itself; the task of the philosopher must be transformed by these revaluations of its tools and subject matter. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s writings ought to recommend (...) a sort of thinker fitted to the pursuit of this task, but owing to his literary style there exists in his works no list of definite prescriptions for philosophical practice nor a simple portrait of such a philosopher. The aim of this paper is to interpret Nietzsche’s writings and extract from them a coherent position on this question. I look mainly to his numerous and varied explorations of the pursuit of knowledge in order to seek out the considerations that shape his normative conception of the philosopher; these largely take the form of case studies of hypothetical truth-seekers. I do not intend to address Nietzsche’s practice as a philosopher himself, only his prescriptions – in general it cannot be assumed that he obeys his own recommendations. It should also be noted that I attend to his descriptive claims only insofar as they relate to this topic, as this is a discussion of prescriptions and not ontology, psychology, etc., and that I limit myself to the published works. (shrink)