In Plato’s Protagoras, prompted by Socrates, Protagoras grapples with the complex problem of the nature of the sophistike techne that he professes. To clarify the nature of his teaching, he reconstructs a history of his discipline, identifying a series of figures who preceded him, concealing their own activities under the guise of other technai. Furthermore, through the famous myth of Prometheus, he places the sphere in which he operates, the politike, at the center of the development of human communities. In (...) response to Protagoras, Socrates, through a curious reinterpretation of the past, identifies Spartan brachylogy and the activities of the Seven Sages as precursors to his own philosophy. As is also evident from the comparison with the Ancient Medicine, in the Protagoras, Plato, not without a hint of irony, seems to stage the fifth century intellectuals’ attempt to define their activity through a skillful reworking of human history. (shrink)

In the Theaetetus, which seeks a definition of knowledge, the first definition of Theaetetus, namely that ‘knowledge is perception’, is easily refuted without the need to refer to Protagoras. But for Plato the refutation of Protagoras is a goal in itself, and he devotes almost half the dialogue to this task. He argues that the doctrine of homo mensura amounts to saying that ‘all judgements are true’ and, using his ‘most exquisite argument’, he claims to prove that it is self-refuting. (...) As many scholars have recognised, this alleged demonstration depends on the arbitrary dropping of the relativistic qualifier that specifies ‘for whom’ a given judgement is true. Plato does not justify the disappearance of the qualifier, but rather tries to disguise it. Indeed, Protagoras has an epistemological conception that is opposed to Plato’s theory of knowledge and that is fundamental to the logical justification of the political conceptions set out in the Republic. For Plato, therefore, the refutation of Protagoras’ doctrine of homo mensura is an imperative ethical requirement. He is not too demanding in his choice of arguments: he does not seek rigour in argumentation, only persuasive effectiveness – more than two millennia of interpretations have proved him right. (shrink)

In this paper, I will first try to refute Lesher’s hypothesis who reads in 18.1 a polemical reference to divination: in the first verse, in fact, Xenophanes merely outlines an exemplum fictum, punctually overturned in 18.2. The fragment must be read, on the contrary, against the historical background that produced it. The language of Xenophanes in B18 is the same as ever and many are the interconnections with the remaining evidences. Here it is enough to recall the link with the (...) two surviving elegies, in which the value of intellectuals is proudly claimed, as opposed to that of the athletes hailed by the masses. It will come as no surprise, therefore, that in B18 the researchers (ζητοῦντες) are celebrated, with a genuine ‘monument’ to what was being discovered at Miletus. I will also try to show how previous interpretations have been vitiated by an unfair devaluation of Xenophanes’ ‘scientific’ activity, seen as a pre-Herodotean ἱστορίη, not as an investigation referring to a methodology that was taking shape and in which Xenophanes largely recognised himself. B18, therefore, is not the first affirmation of coherent ‘philosophical’ interpretation, but the first, brilliant intuition of what enquiry was revealing, in opposition to the mythical tradition, in a passage from μῦθος to λόγος that was gradual, rich in nuances, but irreversible. (shrink)

An examination of Xenophanes’ fragment DK 21 B 34 shows how it to some extent anticipates what is known in contemporary epistemological debate as the “Gettier problem.” According to the argument underlying this problem, it is not enough to have a “justified true belief” in order to be able to say that one has “knowledge.” As Xenophanes’ text has it, even if one were able to say something true, one would not know it yet. This is because, according to Xenophanes, (...) no one is capable of grasping the evident truth of things, since only conjectures about everything are available. But while conjectures cannot rise above the level of pure opinion, they are not all equal: as DK 21 B 18 recognizes, they are perfectible. But what is the basis of this position, which oscillates between scepticism and fallibilism? Since perfectibility never reaches the end (namely the truth), this progress is infinite: the basis of Xenophanes’ epistemology may therefore be his physics of the infinite, which, however, is itself only a conjecture. This entails the risk of self-refutation. To avoid this peril, the doctrine of Parmenides will have to batten down the hatches. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide a comprehensive overview of the contributions made by Livio Rossetti to the methodologies of inquiry into ancient philosophical thought, with a specific focus on the hermeneutical tools he has developed over the course of his extensive research activity. This article will examine, in particular, the concept of “virtual philosophy” and of other “tools of the trade,” which the scholar has further refined within his latest book, Ripensare i presocratici.

This article aims to dialectically synthesize the main theses of Livio Rossetti concerning the origins of philosophy. It considers Rossetti’s central thesis, which has been prominent in recent years, that philosophy does not begin with Thales but rather with Plato, given that in the works of the Athenian philosopher, the semanteme philosoph* appears with a frequency previously unseen. The article also poses a critical inquiry to Rossetti regarding the definition of philosophia that he, at least implicitly, employs to support his (...) theses. (shrink)

The paper provides a brief outline of the biography and works of Stanisław Lisiecki (1872–1960), a little-known Polish classics scholar, who is remembered only, if at all, as a translator of Plato’s Republic. In his early fifties, having given up his career as a Catholic priest, he started working in the field of classics and managed to publish several minor works on Plato in Polish and Latin. His decision to abandon the clergy was not welcomed by many members of the (...) Polish academia and most of his translations of Plato and Aristotle remained unpublished. His renderings of Plato could not compete with the highly accessible translations made by W. Witwicki, which were becoming increasingly popular at that time. Furthermore, Lisiecki’s translations of Aristotle, despite the pioneering nature of his undertaking, met with strong criticism at various university seminars. (shrink)

In Hermias’ commentary on Phaedrus (In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia), it is possible to identify several direct references to the philosophers and pre-Socratic doctrines, including Pythagoras. We point out to three references to Pythagoras in Hermias: (1) Pythagoras is characterized as an unwritten philosopher, (2) there is a special connection with the divinities and Muses, and (3) there is a special connection with the Phaedrus dialogue, revealed by the affinity between Pythagoras and Socrates. We show how the explicit references to Pythagoras (...) in Hermias constitute a certain method of interpreting Platonism: as a philosophy manifested in writing, but which, at the same time, values the unwritten tradition, represented especially by Pythagoras and Socrates. We also demonstrate how the references translated and examined here reveal the image of this Neoplatonic Pythagoras of Hermias, an image which is not necessarily in tune with the oldest doxography, and which permits the reevaluation of Plato’s position as a philosopher who sought to combine unwritten doctrines with his explicit activity as a writer. (shrink)

The form of the Good in Plato’s Phaedo and Republic seems, by our standards, to do too much: it is presented as the metaphysical princi­ple, the epistemological principle and the principle of ethics. Yet this seemingly chimerical object makes good sense in the broader context of Plato’s philosophical project. He sought certain knowledge of neces­sary truths (in sharp contrast to the contingent truth of modern science). Thus, to be knowable the cosmos must be informed by timeless princi­ples; and this leads (...) to teleology and the Good. The form of the Good, it is argued, is what makes the world knowable insofar as it is knowable. This interpretation plugs a significant gap in the scholarship on the Good and draws attention to a deep connection between Plato’s episte­mology and his teleological understanding of the cosmos. (shrink)