Results for 'Epistemic Supervenience'

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  1. Epistemic Supervenience.John Turri - 2010 - In Matthias Steup, Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2 Ed. Blackwell.
    An encyclopedic article on epistemic supervenience in Blackwell companion to epistemology, 2 ed.
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  2. Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma.Colin Ruloff - 2009 - Theoria 75 (2):129-151.
    Epistemic Internalism (EI) is the claim that an agent S is justified in believing that p at a time t iff S has either an actual or potential direct awareness of the grounds or properties that confer justification on p at t . In this paper I argue that EI does not provide the proponent of EI with an intuitively clear analysis of epistemic justification. More exactly, after identifying two different versions of EI – a weak version and (...)
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  3. Epistemic Supervenience RevisitedSelf-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy.James van Cleve & Keith Lehrer - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1049.
  4. Doubts About Epistemic Supervenience.Hamid Vahid - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:153-172.
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  5.  74
    Kripke’s Evil Demon, Cartesian Semantics and Epistemic Supervenience.Andrei V. Nekhaev - 2024 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 61 (2):60-70.
    In his article Evgeny Borisov offers an original solution to Kripke’s sceptical problem of meaning. Its conceptual core is the point of view of the participant of speech acts. He believes that first-person statements of speech act participants like “I know for certain that the expression ‘e’ is used by me in the meaning of m” cannot carry any epistemic fallacies. As a criticism, I propose to point out that non-factual Cartesian semantics have serious epistemic flaws that make (...)
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  6. (1 other version)Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?Debbie Roberts - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold : As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. The main aim in this chapter is to show that none of the available arguments establish, (...)
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  7. Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Synthese 95 (2):275-304.
    Jaegwon Kim and others have claimed that (strong) psychophysical supervenience entails the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. I argue that this claim is unwarranted with respect to epistemic (explanatory) reducibility (either of a global or of a local sort), as well as with respect to ontological reducibility. I then attempt to show that a robust version of nonreductive materialism (which I call supervenient token-physicalism) can be defended against the charge that nonreductive materialism leads to epiphenomenalism in (...)
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  8. The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem.C. S. Sutton - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):619-639.
    Persons think. Bodies, time-slices of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is (...)
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  9.  55
    Charity, Supervenience, and Skepticism.Hamid Vahid - 2001 - Metaphilosophy 32 (3):308-325.
    In a number of articles Donald Davidson has argued that the charitable nature of his method of radical interpretation rules out the possibility of massive error and thus refutes Cartesian skepticism. The diversity of such arguments and the suggestions that are all being made under the name of the principle of charity have prompted a large body of conflicting responses, adding only to the obscurity of the issues that are generally associated with the question of skepticism. In this paper I (...)
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  10. Epistemic semblance in Metaphysics.Sanjit Chakraborty - 2022 - Philosophical Readings 14 (3):125-129.
    Simon Blackburn, in Truth A Guide for the Perplexed (Blackburn 2006), deploys the relation of thought with the facts and says, ‘We met the argument that theorizing involves an impossible activity of stepping outside our own skins and pretending to a ‘transcendental’ point of view, a standpoint from which we can survey the relationship between our thoughts and facts, without using the very forms of thought whose relation to the facts we are hoping to describe.’ (Blackburn, 2006, 109). My philosophical (...)
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  11. Emergentism and supervenience physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):83 – 98.
    A purely metaphysical formulation of physicalism is surprisingly elusive. One popular slogan is, 'There is nothing over and above the physical'. Problems with this arise on two fronts. First, it is difficult to explain what makes a property 'physical' without appealing to the methodology of physics or to particular ways in which properties are known. This obviously introduces epistemic features into the core of a metaphysical issue. Second, it is difficult to cash out 'over-and-aboveness' in a way that is (...)
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  12. Epistemic internalism and testimonial justification.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):458-474.
    ABSTRACTAccording to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that (...)
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  13.  66
    Indicative Conditionals and Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas Icard - 2017 - Proceedings of the Sixteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2017), Liverpool, UK, 24-26 July 2017.
    Recent ideas about epistemic modals and indicative conditionals in formal semantics have significant overlap with ideas in modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic. The purpose of this paper is to show how greater interaction between formal semantics and dynamic epistemic logic in this area can be of mutual benefit. In one direction, we show how concepts and tools from modal logic and dynamic epistemic logic can be used to give a simple, complete axiomatization of Yalcin's [16] (...)
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  14. Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (1):30-46.
    How a group G can know that p has been the subject of much investigation in social epistemology in recent years. This paper clarifies and defends a form of non-supervenient, non-summative group knowledge: G can know that p even if none of the members of G knows that p, and whether or not G knows that p does not locally supervene on the mental states of the members of G. Instead, we argue that what is central to G knowing that (...)
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  15. (1 other version)Propositional and Doxastic Justification: Their Relationship and a Questionable Supervenience Claim.Giorgio Volpe - 2017 - In Bartosz Brożek, Antonino Rotolo & Jerzy Stelmach (eds.), Supervenience and Normativity. Cham: Springer. pp. 25-48.
    Propositional justification pertains to propositions: it is the sort of justification that a proposition enjoys for an agent when the agent is epistemically justified to believe it. By contrast, doxastic justification is justification of beliefs, i.e., of doxastic states actually instantiated by an agent. The ‘orthodox’ view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification is that the latter should be explained in terms of the former, so that an agent’s belief is (doxastically) justified just in case (i) it is (...)
     
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  16.  98
    Mentalism is not epistemic ur-internalism.Evan Butts - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249.
    Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by demonstrating that the (...)
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  17.  11
    Epistemological Naturalism and the Permanent Possibility of Mistakes. 이병덕 - 2019 - Cheolhak-Korean Journal of Philosophy 140:101-124.
    인식론적 자연주의와 관련하여 가장 영향력이 있는 견해는 인식적 수반 논제이다. 그리고 이 논제를 비판하는 가장 대표적인 철학자는 레러이다. 그런데 그의 비판 논변들은 충분히 성공적이지 않다. 따라서 이 논문의 목적은 인식적 수반 논제를 비판하는 새로운 논변을 제시하는 데 있다. 믿음의 인식적 위상은 자연적 또는 기술적 속성에 수반하지 않는다. 그리고 그 이유는 크게 두 가지이다. 첫째, 우리의 믿음이 정당화되는지 여부는 적어도 많은 경우에 그 믿음이 기반하고 있는 인식적 근거들로부터 그 믿음이 추론되는지에 의존한다. 그런데 그와 같은 추론의 타당성 여부는 전제와 결론 사이의 논리적 (...)
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  18.  67
    First-person belief and empirical certainty.David B. Martens - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136.
    This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first- person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object and before adopting the late self-attribution theory of The First Person. I reconstruct that 'middle' theory as involving what I call a 'hard-core' approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle (...)
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  19. A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.Andrew Melnyk - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    A Physicalist Manifesto is a full treatment of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters (...)
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  20. The first-personal argument against physicalism.Christian List - manuscript
    The aim of this paper is to discuss a seemingly straightforward argument against physicalism which, despite being implicit in much of the philosophical debate about consciousness, has not received the attention it deserves (compared to other, better-known “epistemic”, “modal”, and “conceivability” arguments). This is the argument from the non-supervenience of the first-personal (and indexical) facts on the third-personal (and non-indexical) ones. This non-supervenience, together with the assumption that the physical facts (as conventionally understood) are third-personal, entails that (...)
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  21. Pereboom’s Robust Non-reductive Physicalism.Andrew Melnyk - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1191-1207.
    Derk Pereboom has recently elaborated a formulation of non-reductive physicalism in which supervenience does not play the central role and realization plays no role at all; he calls his formulation “robust non-reductive physicalism”. This paper argues that for several reasons robust non-reductive physicalism is inadequate as a formulation of physicalism: it can only rule out fundamental laws of physical-to-mental emergence by stipulating that there are no such laws; it fails to entail the supervenience of the mental on the (...)
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  22. Unbunking Arguments: A Case Study in Metaphysics and Cognitive Science.Christopher Fruge - 2019 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 384-402.
    This chapter develops a style of argument that realists can use to defend the methodological propriety of appealing to a given range of intuitions. Unbunking arguments are an epistemically positive analogue of debunking arguments, and they revolve around the claim that the processes dominantly responsible for beliefs about a given domain are reliable. However, processes cannot always be assessed for accuracy with respect to the relevant domain, so this chapter also develops the cross-domain strategy, which involves arguing that processes known (...)
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  23.  33
    Reduction and Mechanism.Alex Rosenberg - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.
    Reductionism is a widely endorsed methodology among biologists, a metaphysical theory advanced to vindicate the biologist's methodology, and an epistemic thesis those opposed to reductionism have been eager to refute. While the methodology has gone from strength to strength in its history of achievements, the metaphysical thesis grounding it remained controversial despite its significant changes over the last 75 years of the philosophy of science. Meanwhile, antireductionism about biology, and especially Darwinian natural selection, became orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, (...)
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  24. Intentional explanation, psychological laws, and the irreducibility of the first person perspective.Karsten Stueber - unknown
    1. Introduction: Naturalism and Psychological Explanations To a large extent, contemporary philosophical debate takes place within a framework of naturalistic assumptions. From the perspective of the history of philosophy, naturalism is the legacy of positivism without its empiricist epistemology and empiricist conception of meaning and cognitive significance. Systematically, it is best to characterize naturalism as the philosophical articulation of the underlying presuppositions of a reductive scientific research program that was rather successful in the last few centuries and, equally important, promises (...)
     
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  25. Contingentism in Metaphysics.Kristie Miller - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):965-977.
    In a lot of domains in metaphysics the tacit assumption has been that whichever metaphysical principles turn out to be true, these will be necessarily true. Let us call necessitarianism about some domain the thesis that the right metaphysics of that domain is necessary. Necessitarianism has flourished. In the philosophy of maths we find it held that if mathematical objects exist, then they do of necessity. Mathematical Platonists affirm the necessary existence of mathematical objects (see for instance Hale and Wright (...)
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  26. Group virtue epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Synthese 197 (12):5233-5251.
    According to Sosa, knowledge is apt belief, where a belief is apt when accurate because adroit. Sosa :465–475, 2010; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) adds to his triple-A analysis of knowledge, a triple-S analysis of competence, where a complete competence combines its seat, shape and situation. Much of Sosa’s influential work assumes that epistemic agents are individuals who acquire knowledge when they hit the truth through exercising their own individual skills in appropriate shapes and situations. This (...)
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  27. Bigger, Badder Bugs.Benjamin A. Levinstein & Jack Spencer - 2025 - Mind 134 (533):134-170.
    In this paper we motivate the ‘principles of trust’, chance-credence principles that are strictly stronger than the New Principle yet strictly weaker than the Principal Principle, and argue, by proving some limitative results, that the principles of trust conflict with Humean Supervenience.
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  28. (2 other versions)What is "naturalized epistemology?".Jaegwon Kim - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:381-405.
    This paper analyzes and evaluates quine's influential thesis that epistemology should become a chapter of empirical psychology. quine's main point, it is argued, is that normativity must be banished from epistemology and, more generally, philosophy. i claim that without a normative concept of justification, we lose the very concept of knowledge, and that belief ascription itself becomes impossible without a normative concept of rationality. further, the supervenience of concepts of epistemic appraisal shows that normative epistemology is indeed possible.
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  29. Having Reason in Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    The project consists of a defense of the reductivist program generally and an application of the program to the theory of epistemic justification. ;Chapter One sets out the problem of reducing justification to other terms and defends the legitimacy of this problem against attacks by Quine in particular and supervenience theorists generally. Chapter Two is an explication and refutation of all possible theories which reduce justification-facts to facts about the reliability of cognitive processes. All such theories founder due (...)
     
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  30. Value Theory.Francesco Orsi - 2015 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
    What is it for a car, a piece of art or a person to be good, bad or better than another? In this first book-length introduction to value theory, Francesco Orsi explores the nature of evaluative concepts used in everyday thinking and speech and in contemporary philosophical discourse. The various dimensions, structures and connections that value concepts express are interrogated with clarity and incision. -/- Orsi provides a systematic survey of both classic texts including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Moore and Ross (...)
  31. A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content.Paul Silva - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2465-2487.
    Various sexist and racist beliefs ascribe certain negative qualities to people of a given sex or race. Epistemic allies are people who think that in normal circumstances rationality requires the rejection of such sexist and racist beliefs upon learning of many counter-instances, i.e. members of these groups who lack the target negative quality. Accordingly, epistemic allies think that those who give up their sexist or racist beliefs in such circumstances are rationally responding to their evidence, while those who (...)
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  32. Phenomenal Concepts.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal concepts plays an important role (...)
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  33. Moral Choice and Rational Choice: Grappling with Moral Dilemmas Rationally.Sung-hak Kang - 1990 - Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
    Representing moral choice as a function of rational choice is carried out by formalizing moral evaluation into a functional mechanism called "Moral Choice Function" whose domain is information on a state of affairs and range is a moral judgment, and upon which formal and substantive requirements are imposed. The notions such as impartiality, universalizability, proportionality, and informational invariance are employed for the issue of how to solve conflict of values faced by an individual as well as collective moral agent. By (...)
     
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  34.  4
    Wang Yang-ming’s Theory of Liang-zhi——A New Interpretation of Wang Yang-ming’s Philosophy.Yiu-Ming Fung - 2012 - Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies 42 (2):261-300.
    The most important term in Wang Yang-ming’s 王陽明 (1472-1528) philosophy, “liang-zhi 良知,” has been interpreted in various different ways. However, these different interpretations have failed to provide a satisfactory understanding of Wang Yang-ming’s philosophy. To give a reasonable interpretation of Wang Yang-ming’s idea of liang-zhi that coheres with his philosophy, we have to move beyond the approach of mentalism, no matter whether it be of a transcendental or nontranscendental type. In this paper, I elaborate the deep structure of liang-zhi and (...)
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  35. Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A General Framework.Christian List - 2024 - In Katie Robertson & Alastair Wilson (eds.), Levels of Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    This expository paper presents a general framework for representing levels and inter-level relations. The framework is intended to capture both epistemic and ontological notions of levels and to clarify the sense in which levels of explanation might or might not be related to a levelled ontology. The framework also allows us to study and compare different kinds of inter-level relations, especially supervenience and reduction but also grounding and mereological constitution. This, in turn, enables us to explore questions such (...)
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  36. Laws of Nature and Theory Choice.Alessandro Torza - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-28.
    I articulate a Global Best-System Account (GBSA) of laws of nature along broadly Mill–Ramsey–Lewis lines. The guiding idea is that the job of laws is to capture real patterns across time—where a pattern is real if it allows to compress information about matters of particular fact. The GBSA’s key ingredient is a definition of ‘best system’ in terms of a ranking method that meets a number of desiderata: it is rigorously defined; it outputs the ranking based on the candidate systems’ (...)
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  37. The Q factor: Modal rationalism versus modal autonomism.Joseph Levine - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):365-380.
    Type-B materialists (to use David Chalmers's jargon) claim that though zombies are conceivable, they are not metaphysically possible. This article calls this position regarding the relation between metaphysical and epistemic modality “modal autonomism,” as opposed to the “modal rationalism” endorsed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, who insist on a deep link between the two forms of modality. This article argues that the defense of modal rationalism presented in Chalmers and Jackson (2001) begs the question against the type-B materialist/modal (...)
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  38. Nature unmirrored, epistemology naturalized.Ernest Sosa - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):49 - 72.
    A. Knowledge and Justification: The nature of epistemic justification and its supervenience.B. Understanding and Validation: Two projects of epistemology, one to understand justification, the other to promote it.
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  39.  26
    Anscombe, la expresión de autoconciencia y la regla de autorreferencia.Javier Vidal - 2012 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 68:133-154.
    “The First Person” is the paper where G. E. M. Anscombe supports the thesis that “I” is not a referring word. Mainly I deal with her argument against the indexical view of “I” from the scenario of the “A” user, who refers to himself as the person who is under the special observation of the “A” user. On the one hand, I put forward that a use of “A” might have a guaranteed reference in a semantic sense: a referential use (...)
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  40. Three Arguments for Humility.David Yates - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):461-481.
    Ramseyan humility is the thesis that we cannot know which properties realize the roles specified by the laws of completed physics. Lewis seems to offer a sceptical argument for this conclusion. Humean fundamental properties can be permuted as to their causal roles and distribution throughout spacetime, yielding alternative possible worlds with the same fundamental structure as actuality, but at which the totality of available evidence is the same. On the assumption that empirical knowledge requires evidence, we cannot know which of (...)
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  41.  97
    How the Modalities Come into the World.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (1):89-112.
    The modalities come into the world by being projections or objectivizations of our epistemic constitution. Thus this paper is a statement of Humean projectivism. In fact, it goes beyond Simon Blackburn’s version. It is also designed as a comprehensive counter-program to David Lewis’ program of Humean supervenience. In detail, the paper explains: Already the basic fact that the world is a world of states of affairs is due to the nature of our epistemic states. Objects, which figure (...)
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  42.  96
    How to be realistic about folk psychology.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
    Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among (...)
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  43. Pluralism About Group Knowledge: A Reply to Jesper Kallestrup.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (1):39-45.
    Jesper Kallestrup has provided an insightful response to our paper, “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge”. Kallestrup identifies some important issues pertaining to our non-summative, non-supervenient account of group knowledge which we did not address in our original paper. Here, we develop our view further in light of Kallestrup’s helpful reply.
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  44.  12
    The Worth of Persons by James Franklin (review).Louis Groarke - 2023 - Review of Metaphysics 77 (2):349-351.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Worth of Persons by James FranklinLouis GroarkeFRANKLIN, James. The Worth of Persons, New York: Encounter Books, 2022. 272 pp. Cloth, $30.99In The Worth of Persons, James Franklin, the well-known Aristotelian mathematician, sets out to provide an account of the very first principles of ethics and morality. Franklin argues that morality begins with an acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of human persons, understood as beings possessing “dignity” or (...)
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  45.  39
    The causal structure of Frankfurt‐ and PAP‐style cases.Matthew Rellihan - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (4):537-560.
    Frankfurt‐style cases suggest that an agent's moral responsibility for an action supervenes on the causal history of that action—at least when epistemic considerations are held constant. However, PAP‐style cases suggest that moral responsibility does not supervene on causal history, for judgments concerning an agent's responsibility for an action are also sensitive to the presence of alternative—and causally idle—possibilities. I appeal to the causal modeling tradition and the definitions of actual causation that derive therefrom in an attempt to resolve this (...)
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  46. Moral Mistakes.Zed Adams - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (1):1-21.
    Is it possible to show that a moral claim is mistaken without taking a moral stand with regard to it? A striking number of contemporary metaethicists suppose that it is. In this paper, I argue against a prominent line of support for this supposition. My goal is to cast suspicion on a general tendency to think that the epistemic standing of moral claims is something that can be assessed from outside the practices of making and critically evaluating moral judgements. (...)
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  47.  39
    What’s Wrong With Methodism?Noah M. Lemos - 1998 - Metaphilosophy 29 (1&2):79-94.
    I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one’s justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one’s justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because (...)
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  48. The essentials of persons.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):227-41.
    This paper tries to clarify the nature of philosophical questions as to the ontological nature of things, especially persons. It considers implications of an Aristotelian account, which leads to an ontology that makes subjects and other things epistemologically remote. This makes the account doubtfully reconcilable with the special epistemic relation that each of us has to oneself, via for example the cogito.
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  49.  25
    The Foundationalism-Coherentism Debate in Light of the Post-Wittgensteinian Ontological Enlightenment.Murat Bac - 2017 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 18 (2):141-157.
    The perennial problem of the exact nature of epistemic justification has recently become even more interesting upon Laurence BonJour's openly converting himself to foundationalism following a long and successful career built mainly around a strong defense of coherentism cum internalism. Even though the famous debate between foundationalism and coherentism is often associated with the "technical" issues of epistemic regress, basic beliefs, and so on, in this paper I will approach the debate from the standpoint of the post-Wittgensteinian literature (...)
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  50.  27
    Aesthetic antirealism.Brandon L. Cooke - 2003 - Dissertation, St. Andrews
    A puzzle is generated by two intuitions about artworks: 1. There is no prima facie reason to take artworks to be mind-independent objects; 2. Aesthetic judgments are objective. These intuitions seem to be in tension, for if artworks or their aesthetic properties are mind-dependent, how can aesthetic judgments be objective? The common solution to the puzzle lies in rejecting or revising one of the two intuitions. Typically, realists reject 1, and many antirealists reject 2. I develop an antirealist aesthetic theory (...)
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