Implicaciones Metafilosóficas de Los Desacuerdos Filosóficos Profundos

Cuadernos de Filosofía: Universidad de Concepción 40:117-138 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper I explore the metaphilosophical consequences of deep disagree-ments in philosophy. I argue that deep philosophical disagreements imply a challenge for philosophy since deep philosophical disagreements hinder ratio-nal decision between philosophical theories. That makes demanding or offe-ring reasons for philosophical theory useless. To overcome this, I argue that philosophical argument is an end in itself and not a means to rational reso-lution of deep philosophical disagreements. I describe two theories that at-tempt to explain deep disagreements in general. Next, I distinguish between intraphilosophical and interphilosophical disagreement. Thus, interphilosophical disagreements are those that are deep philosophical disagreements, while in-traphilosophical disagreements are disagreements between epistemic peers. Subsequently, I explore the consequences of deep philosophical disagreements and conclude that epistemic and practical reasons fail to provide a rational res-ponse to deep philosophical disagreements. Finally, I respond to two objections about argumentative language in philosophical debates and the impossibility of philosophical progress.

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Octavio García
University of Manchester

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