Self-Deception and the Limits of Folk Psychology

Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):1-13 (2009)
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Abstract

This article considers the product of self-deception. Many assume, or argue, that the product of self-deception is a belief. I argue against this being a general truth by outlining some of the ways in which the self-deceived can be deeply conflicted, such that there is no fact of the matter concerning what they believe. These situations are not adequately addressed by many accounts of self-deception. Further, I argue that this task requires going beyond our folk psychological classifications.

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Eric Funkhouser
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Citations of this work

Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Willful ignorance and self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
Beliefs as signals: A new function for belief.Eric Funkhouser - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):809-831.
On the “tension” inherent in self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.
In-between believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.

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