Diachronic coherence versus epistemic impartiality

Philosophical Review 109 (3):349-371 (2000)
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Abstract

It is obvious that we would not want to demand that an agent' s beliefs at different times exhibit the same sort of consistency that we demand from an agent' s simultaneous beliefs; there' s nothing irrational about believing P at one time and not-P at another. Nevertheless, many have thought that some sort of coherence or stability of beliefs over time is an important component of epistemic rationality.

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David Christensen
Brown University

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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
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Epistemic Expansions.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):217-236.

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References found in this work

Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
How should future opinion affect current opinion?Richard Foley - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):747-766.

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